Seminar: Paolo Leonetti (Bocconi University),“Equivalent extensive form games”, 18 December , 14.00

On December 18, 2017, 14.00-15.00, Dr. Leonetti Paolo (Bocconi University) will give a talk on “Equivalent extensive form games”.


Two extensive form games with imperfect information are said to be behaviorally equivalent if they share the same reduced normal form with respect to terminal paths. Accordingly, we show that two extensive form games are behaviorally equivalent if and only if one can be transformed into the other through a composition of two elementary transformations, commonly known as “Interchanging of Simultaneous Moves” and “Coalescing Moves / Sequential Agent Splitting.” Then, we study the invariance of known solution concepts with respect to these transformations, such as variants of Sequential equilibrium and Extensive Form Rationalizability.


Keywords: Games with imperfect information, Sequential equilibrium, behavioral equivalence.